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CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT AND THE LAW: 
THE BIG PICTURE 
DAVID W. BATES* 
The use of health information technology (“HIT”) in the United States 
appears to be growing rapidly, in part as the result of the substantial 
incentives which have been put in place through American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) and the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act of 2009, which authorized 
incentives for providers who could demonstrate they were “meaningful 
users” of HIT.1  The rationale for providing these incentives and for 
encouraging adoption of HIT has been the belief that the use of health 
information technology will improve the quality, safety and efficiency of care. 
However, many of the benefits of health information technology occur 
through clinical decision support.  A study by the Center for Health 
Information Technology Leadership estimated that advanced clinical 
decision support costs nearly five times as much as basic Clinical Decision 
Support (“CDS”), but produced nearly twelve times as much financial 
return.2 It is also already clear that the complexity of delivering health care 
routinely exceeds the bounds of human cognition, with just one example 
being the use of medications in patients with renal insufficiency.3 
Substantial evidence exists that the quality of care does not improve 
simply through use of electronic health records by providers, even over 
time.4  A major reason for this is that left to their own devices, providers are 
slow to adopt clinical decision support. But there is strong evidence that 
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clinical decision support is effective in specific circumstances, for example 
for preventive conditions, some chronic diseases such as diabetes and 
coronary artery disease, and especially for medication-related decision 
support.5 
Furthermore, while the meaningful use criteria are an important and 
major step in the right direction, they have been minimally prescriptive with 
respect to clinical decision support.  For example, the 2011 criteria required 
only that providers implement at least one clinical rule.6 For drug-drug 
interactions in particular, providers were required to use a record that 
included this functionality, but there is no test regarding whether or not that 
function performs well.7 
However, HIT can also cause harm, and clinical decision support in 
particular is vulnerable in this regard.8  A study by Strom et al. showed that 
a “hard stop” alert intended to reduce the frequency of concomitant orders 
for warfarin and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxizole kept four patients from 
receiving medications they needed, even though it was effective in reducing 
the frequency of co-prescription.9  Another, more worrisome study by Han et 
al. found that the mortality rate for children transferred into special care 
climbed from 2.8% to 6.6% after introduction of a computerized physician 
order entry application, probably largely because it slowed providers down 
in caring for critically ill children. 10 
Clinical decision support is especially tricky, since not having enough is 
a problem, but so is having too many false positive warnings.  In particular, 
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there are major issues with alert fatigue.  This occurs when providers receive 
large numbers of false positive results, which can result in failure to pay 
attention even to warnings that are important. In a study of drug-drug 
interactions, in which Paterno et al. compared “tiering” of alerts– where 
some alerts were considered more important than others–with an approach 
that did not use tiering, the alert compliance rate was much higher at the 
site with tiered DDI alerts compared to the non-tiered site (29% vs. 10%,  
p<0.001).11 At the tiered site, 100% of most severe alerts were accepted, 
versus only 34% at the non-tiered site—so that providers ignored about two 
thirds of the most serious warnings without tiering.12 In addition, alerts of 
moderate severity were also more likely to be accepted at the tiered site 
(29% vs. 10%).13 
I.  LIABILITY AND CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT 
Liability issues have had major perverse consequences in this area.  
Nearly all medication-related decision support is supplied by a small 
number of vendors.14 However, they have been reluctant to turn off clinically 
unimportant warnings in part because they have received legal advice that 
the consequences of failure to warn are much greater than those of over-
warning. Organizations themselves can make changes to the levels of 
warnings, but this represents a substantial amount of work and is only 
feasible for large organizations, however, sometimes contracts actually 
preclude making such changes. 
The issue of false-positive warnings and what level to set them at extends 
to many other areas beyond medication-related clinical decision support.  
For example, false-positives represent a very important problem in cardiac 
monitoring, and over-monitoring appears to be common.15 
With respect to liability, there has been substantial fear that failure to 
warn would result in liability to the vendor delivering the decision support, 
with little concern about the potential adverse consequences of false-positive 
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warnings.16 This is the case even though there appear to be few if any cases 
in which lawsuits have been brought because of failure to warn.17 
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE RIDGELY AND GREENBERG REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first strategy that is recommended is development of a clinically 
significant DDI list.18 Such a list for the most serious DDIs, and also for DDIs 
that do not need to be displayed have already been developed as part of a 
contract between RAND and ONC.19 These lists are likely to apply to all 
organizations, and the content of the two lists is unlikely to evolve rapidly, 
though there will likely be additions to both lists over time.  However, the 
vast bulk of DDIs including most of the ones with clinical consequences 
occur in the range that is in the middle of these two areas, and thus there is 
still an important role for the vendors in this area. 
If such a list were to be developed and maintained that would cover all 
medications, it would be a common good.20  However, developing and 
maintaining it would require ongoing federal support.  Such an effort could 
be undertaken by a group of the societies as suggested, but no entity 
currently has such a role, and it would be essential that a single entity take it 
on.  One entity that could undertake this role might be a new National 
Transportation Safety Board-like entity, which was recommended in the 
recent Institute of Medicine report on unintended consequences,21 though 
no such entity exists to date and it is unclear whether or not Congress will 
provide the support that would be needed to establish it. 
A second suggestion that Ridgely and Greenberg make is that the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) could reverse its current policy and 
regulate medical software, possibly as a Class III device.22 The recent 
Institute of Medicine report addressed this at some length, and 
recommended that the Secretary of HHS should monitor and publicly report 
on the progress of safety annually beginning in 2012, but stopped short of 
recommending regulation by the FDA.23 There were a number of concerns 
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raised by some committee members that this might stifle innovation.24  
Nonetheless, the committee expressed considerable concern about the 
current state of affairs.25 
The third and fourth strategies Ridgely and Greenberg suggested are 
that ONC work with CMS to revisit the issue of endorsing a clinically 
significant DDI list as part of meaningful use,26 and that ONC could certify 
the list.27 In fact, ONC already has sponsored our research group to identify 
a list of the most dangerous drug-drug interactions,28 as well as a list of 
drug-drug interactions that are often included as warnings in systems that 
are low-risk, which has been accomplished.29 This should be helpful, but 
most of the clinically important drug-drug interactions fall between the two 
extremes, so that what has been done to date is not comprehensive.30 Thus, 
additional work would need to be done, and it would be essential to have 
monitoring and maintenance of the database, as new drugs are being 
introduced all the time and the knowledge base is changing. The companies 
engaged in this domain have played a valuable role in this area.  It would, 
however, be possible to require that the most dangerous drug-drug 
interactions be included in all systems, either as a certification criterion, or 
through meaningful use.  The certification criteria to date have not gotten to 
this level of detail with respect to granularity, but they could. 
The fifth suggestion by Ridgely and Greenberg is that Congress could 
create a “safe harbor” for providers who adopt and use the approved list.31 
This could be helpful, especially if it made it possible to turn off many of the 
unimportant warnings.  However, drug-drug interactions are only a small 
part of the larger clinical decision support picture.  It would be helpful if 
providers had to take a test on a periodic basis to ensure that their software 
includes key warnings.  Such a test has already been developed for inpatient 
systems, and an outpatient version will soon be released.32 
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CONCLUSION 
A major problem exists with the status quo respecting to medication-
related clinical decision support overall, and with drug-drug interactions in 
particular.  Too many warnings are being displayed on a regular basis, 
which has predictable adverse consequences.  Many of the reasons for this 
probably relate to fear of liability.  If some of the steps in this article are 
taken, all parties could be better off. 
 
 
